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1. Introduction  
The Danish National Board of Health has adapted the World Health Organization´s International Classification for 
Patient Safety (ICPS) for classifying incidents reported to the national Danish Patient Safety Database (DPSD). 
Originally launched in January 2004, this was the first nationwide, mandatory and non-punitive incident reporting 
scheme in healthcare, and was explicitly defined to support learning from incidents. The number of reports received by 
the system has grown from 5,000 in 2004 to 34,000 in 2010. The update of the Danish system will include reporting 
not only from hospital staff, but also from the primary sector, clinics and nursing homes, and, later, patients and their 
relatives.  
In this paper we review some characteristics of the Danish incident reporting system and considerations before and 
following a validation of a pilot version in 2010.  
2. Current characteristics of the Danish national reporting system  
Incident reports are submitted by healthcare staff, typically by someone involved in the incident. While a report may be 
submitted anonymously, most are submitted and dealt with confidentially (i.e., name and identity of the reporter is 
known to the local risk managers). This provides the local risk manager with the opportunity for talking face-to-face 
with the reporting healthcare staff member, possibly eliciting more information about the incident. A report contains, 
besides demographic and administrative data, a free-text description of the incident in three text fields: description, 
consequences, suggested recommendations. When the incident has been handled locally, it is then anonymized and 
submitted to the DSPS including a classification of the incident(s) it contains into a mandatory and perhaps a detailed 
optional part of ICPS.  
Most reports received by the DPSD contain relatively short narratives (typically about 50-200 words) and they 
sometimes do not contain enough information to allow identification of specific root causes or latent conditions [1]. 
Severe or potentially severe incidents are examined by an investigation committee, using some causal analysis 
method or some variant of root cause analysis (RCA). These incidents are also reported to the national database after 
investigations, and such reports necessarily will contain more information about contributing factors (and 
recommendations for interventions). However, under current practice the full and detailed analysis reports will typically 
not be shared, since analyses are carried out under condition of confidentiality.  
3. Using an incident reporting system to improve safety  
An incident reporting system that maintains a properly structured database of incident reports can be used to improve 
safety in different ways: descriptive statistical analysis of frequencies, dissemination of lessons learned, and analysis 
of multiple reports of “similar” incidents - sometimes called “aggregate analysis”.  
Statistical information about the frequency of specific types of problems or failures and their co-occurrence is of only 
limited value, as it is well-known that only a small part of actual incidents are reported, and the distribution of types of 
incidents that are reported may contain unknown biases. Nevertheless, this information can be used to prioritize 
resources and focus on, for example, selected high-frequency failure types.  
When an incident occurs, investigators may wish to consult reports of similar incidents to explore information about 
causes and perhaps interventions: What has been done to avoid repetition of this type of accident? What is the 
experience from and the results of any evaluation of the intervention? While some recommendations may be validated 
and may eventually become national guidelines, others may be more specific to local conditions, and other healthcare 
institutions will have to consider adaptation more carefully. This is only possible for those incidents where an 
investigation was carried out, and not for short reports.  
Aggregate analysis of similar incidents involves the retrieval of multiple reports of similar incidents for the purpose of 
investigating patterns of possible causal factors. There is a long and well-established tradition in aviation human 
factors for performing this type of analysis, when analysts retrieve anonymized reports from a database- for instance, 
from the confidential ASRS (Aviation Safety Reporting System) in order to study similar safety problems (runway 
incursions, take-off incidents, pilot fatigue etc.) [2]. The DPSD has similarly been supplying data to support the 
analysis of incidents involving cardiac arrest mishaps [3], infusion pumps [4], patient handoffs [1].  
The use of multiple reports can provide a richer picture of various precursors, direct causes and consequences [5;6]. 
Such analyses may be enriched if retrieval is based on breadth as well as depth: gathering reports of incidents of the 
same type, but also reports where the selected failure plays a minor role, e.g. as either cause or consequence of 
another.  
This type of analysis differs from RCAs in a number of ways. A classical RCA focuses on an individual adverse event 
or a set of such events. Such events are generally complex and may involve several different failures each of which 
being addressed separately during the investigation. An adverse event will often be the result of coincidentally co-
occurring different factors, making it difficult to judge the relative importance (frequency) of each failure. RCAs are 
designed to identify so-called root causes (latent conditions) and use the analysis as a basis for recommendations or 
interventions. RCA teams are focused on finding root causes, and there is a risk that the root cause identified may 
depend more on the method of investigation rather than the information gathered. Many resources are spent on 
RCAs: the analysis is time-consuming, and it may produce recommendations that are “limited to their particular 
´sphere of influence´” as noted by Taitz et al [7;8]; similar misgivings are voiced by Wu et al. [7].  
In comparison, an aggregate analysis based on multiple incident reports is focused on a particular type of failure 
chosen for its general recurrence or criticality (rather than its role in a particular incident). This focus will tend to restrict 
the scope of the resulting recommendations for intervention and the possibility of monitoring implementation and 
effects. In principle, an aggregate analysis will be limited to the written narratives contained in the incident reports, 
having little opportunity to acquire further information via interviews, both because details are forgotten some time 
after the incident and because anonymity in the incident reporting scheme may make it cumbersome to elicit further 
information from the healthcare staff involved in the incident. The inclusion of multiple reports is expected to allow a 
richer picture of various causes and consequences although information in short reports is probably limited to the 
actual ´visible´ failures and may not be sufficient to reveal systemic causes or human factors. Furthermore, some 
incidents may be highly dependent on local conditions and thus difficult to compare.  
4. Adapting the ICPS  
A taxonomy provides a common vocabulary for comparable incidents, facilitating comparison across both national and 
regional borders. It also allows the grouping of similar incidents, which enables statistics and retrieval (for comparison 
and analysis). Nevertheless, it is important that the input phase does not become too cumbersome or time-consuming 
for risk managers, who receive and classify incident reports.  
The previous taxonomy contained nine categories, among which risk managers had to pick one. After adaptation of 
the ICPS, the taxonomy requires users to pick one or several among a much larger set of non-exclusive incident 
types. For the mandatory part, users must select one or several among 26 types and, if they pass on to the wider and 
more detailed optional part, among 100+ incident types. This may make it more time-consuming to classify reports, 
since risk managers are encouraged to select all relevant categories for each reported incident. On the other hand, 
the taxonomy will match the reported incidents better and will also support local analysis by providing a standard 
framework. (At the time of writing, March 2011, experience with the new system is still too scant to allow any 
conclusions).  
Although the taxonomy may be used to capture essential aspects of reported incidents in terms of incident types, it is 
important that narrative text is preserved. Thus, there are relevant aspects of an incident that are not represented by 
the categories, notably time lines and causal relations between several failures in one incident.  
The Danish adaptation of ICPS is mainly based on a single class: Incident types. ICPS provides a separate class for 
contributing factors. This concept, however, encompasses different phenomena. 1) Some contributing factors are 
incidents in their own right, e.g. a communication failure leading to a medication error. 2) Other contributing factors are 
latent conditions [9] or root causes, such as inadequate procedures or resources, and are therefore not events but 
“standing conditions” that make the occurrence of adverse events more likely.  
This duality is apparent in ICPS, where organizational phenomena are represented as both Incident type and 
Contributing factor - with similar (though not identical) name and subtypes. For example, communication failures are 
classified as a contributing (human) factor. But strictly speaking, a communication failure is an incident, not a latent 
condition - whereas the absence of protocol, say, for transferring information about vital signs may be said to be a 
latent condition.  
In recognition of the fact that a given factor may be regarded as the focal point in one investigation and as a causal 
precursor in another, the Danish adaptation of ICPS has not implemented a separate class for contributing factors. 
Users are encouraged to indicate all failures as incident types. Thus, the classification of any given incident will 
convey information about all failures and factors involved, but not about the temporal and causal priority of events and 
conditions. The latter are contained in the individual narrative and, when provided, the analysis of the incident.  
Some incident types have been expanded to also include systemic factors. In particular, Resources and organization 
covers both occasional failures such as coincidental understaffing or unavailability of relevant procedures, and latent 
conditions such as inadequate procedures or permanent understaffing. Furthermore, Documentation was expanded to 
include Communication, which is often treated as a contributing factor.  
A prototype version of the DPSD has been validated, targeting the mandatory part of the system only (26 types of 
incidents). The validation involved a test of reliability (58 events, 33 raters) and a wider elicitation of usability problems 
(65 participants) the results of which are described in detail in separate publications [10;11]  
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